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4.1 Introduction
Although it is natural to suppose that years of retirement are a normal
good, so that increases in wealth would lead to earlier retirement, it has
been diﬃcult for research to estimate plausible wealth eﬀects on retire-
ment.1 Part of the reason for the diﬃculty is that some of the cross-section
variation in wealth is the result of taste variation: for example, people who
are especially risk averse will tend to accumulate more wealth and to retire
later than those who are less risk averse. Also, it is diﬃcult to control for
the quality of the job: higher paying jobs tend to have amenities that make
work more pleasant, thus delaying retirement, and at the same time, higher
incomes are associated with greater rates of wealth accumulation. Such
positive cross-section correlations between wealth and retirement age are
apparently large enough to oﬀset negative correlations induced by a wealth
eﬀect on retirement.
In panel data, observed wealth change may not be related to a wealth
eﬀect on retirement. Economic models of wealth accumulation and retire-
ment imply that individuals accumulate wealth so that they can retire at an
optimal age. As long as there are no unforeseen changes in the environment
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1. Two examples are Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) and Samwick (1998). Both report
small wealth eﬀects on retirement.or in other determinants of retirement, the optimal retirement age will not
change over time. The constancy of the optimal anticipated retirement age
holds, whether individuals save at a high rate (large wealth accumulation)
or at a low rate. The result is that we should observe no relationship be-
tween wealth change and changes in anticipated retirement simply because
the anticipated retirement age would not change. Only when there are unan-
ticipated changes in the determinants of retirement would the optimal
anticipated retirement age change.
The stock market boom of the mid-1990s to 2000, and the subsequent
bust between 2000 and 2002, provide an opportunity to study what was
likely an unexpected wealth change for at least part of the population. The
boom produced wealth increases for some that were substantially similar
to the thought experiment of giving large windfall wealth increases to the
population that was approaching retirement, making it possible to avoid
many of the diﬃculties associated with nonexperimental data. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to study the associated change in actual retirement
and in expected retirement of that population.
In 1992 the age-eligible respondents in the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) were approximately ﬁfty-one to sixty-one years old (Juster and
Suzman 1995). Their ﬁnancial resources included private savings, part of
which was invested in the stock market, part in the bond market, and part
in checking and savings accounts and other miscellaneous assets. They
also had claims to pensions, some of which were direct beneﬁt (DB) plans
and some direct contribution (DC) plans.
Between wave 1 in 1992 and wave 2 in 1994, the stock market increased
in value by 14 percent as measured by the New York Stock Exchange
Composite Index (NYSEI). However, beginning in 1994, stock prices in-
creased at much greater rates than they had historically: between waves 2
and 4 in 1998 the NYSEI increased by 90 percent. Thus, between 1994 and
1998 many households had large gains in wealth. By historical projection,
much of these gains would have been unanticipated and could reasonably
be taken to be exogenous to previous decisions about saving and antici-
pated retirement. The stock market continued to rise until about August,
2000, and then dropped sharply until about August, 2002, when it was
about 27 percent below its peak. Although the decline was not sustained
for as long as the increase, in terms of deviations from expectations it likely
was sharper.
Under the assumption that some of the gains and losses in the stock mar-
ket were unanticipated, the increase and subsequent decline in wealth have
aspects of a natural experiment in which some households had large
changes in wealth in the years shortly before retirement and others did not.
A number of households would have had similar economic positions in
1994 except that their portfolio mix diﬀered: some held stocks and some
128 Michael D. Hurd, Monika Reti, and Susann Rohwedderdid not. Some households had ﬁrm-directed DC plans that invested in
stocks and some had plans that invested in bonds. These households would
have had very diﬀerent changes in the value of their private assets and in
their DC plans, and the diﬀerential change would not have been expected
and would have been only partially under their control. Thus, variation in
tastes that makes the interpretation of nonexperimental data so diﬃcult is
likely to be much less important.
In summary, there were large changes in wealth for some of the respon-
dents, and some of the wealth change can be assumed to be unanticipated.
Their behavior in the waves following the large changes can be compared
with the behavior of respondents who had no such wealth changes, and the
diﬀerence can be attributed to a windfall wealth eﬀect.
Our main research question is: how did the large increase and subse-
quent decline in wealth aﬀect behavior? An obvious response for workers
in the age range of the HRS is to buy more leisure by retiring earlier than
anticipated or by delaying retirement following a loss in wealth. We will
study actual retirement and anticipated retirement as measured by the sub-
jective probability of working past age sixty-two, which is asked in every
wave of HRS. We ask whether those with wealth gains retired earlier than
those who did not have them, and whether anticipated retirement as mea-
sured by the subjective probability of working past age sixty-two changed
in the panel in response to the wealth changes. The diﬀerence between ac-
tual and anticipated retirement should be particularly informative, as it
will show whether those workers that had large gains in wealth actually
retired earlier than their intentions as stated before any windfall gain in
wealth. This will be a direct measure of the elasticity of retirement with re-
spect to wealth that takes into account any individual propensity to retire.
By comparing changes in retirement or retirement intentions during the
stock market boom period with changes in retirement or retirement inten-
tions during the bust period, we will ﬁnd whether there are asymmetries in
responses to wealth gain compared with wealth loss.
4.1.1 Prior Research
Besides econometric estimations based on conventional household sur-
veys, as in Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), there have been three ap-
proaches to estimating the eﬀect on labor supply of unexpected wealth
gains. Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (1999, 2001) estimated the eﬀect of
windfall gains in wealth from the behavior of lottery winners. Their basic
ﬁnding was that large gains induced a reduction in labor force participa-
tion, but the magnitude was small in the population, although larger
among those of retirement age. The age diﬀerence is very plausible, in that
many workers approaching retirement age may be on the margin of work-
ing or retiring, so that a positive wealth shock could induce retirement.
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wealth shock would represent a greater increase in the fraction of the rest-
of-lifetime resources of older workers, so the eﬀect should be greater.
A second approach is based on inheritances. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian,
and Rosen (1993) used 1982 and 1986 IRS tax records on inheritances and
income to estimate the eﬀect of large wealth gains on labor force partici-
pation. Based on their estimates, we calculate that a wealth gain of about
$300,000 would reduce participation by about seven percentage points.
Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) used the PSID to estimate the eﬀects of in-
heritances on labor supply, but they found substantially smaller eﬀects
than Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen.
Cheng and French (2000) used the estimates based on the lottery ﬁnd-
ings and on the Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen ﬁndings on inheri-
tances to calculate the eﬀects of the stock market gains between Decem-
ber31, 1994, and December 31, 1999. They estimated that about two-thirds
of the gain in the stock market over that time period was unanticipated.
From that estimate, along with the behavioral responses due to lotteries
and inheritances, they calculated that labor force participation among
those ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-four years old was about 1.1 percentage points lower
than it would have been in the absence of the stock market run-up. While
this is a carefully done and useful study, it is based on many constructed var-
iables and the samples in the underlying studies are small, especially for the
lottery study.
The third approach for ﬁnding the eﬀects of the stock market boom on
retirement is based on HRS data on actual retirement or expected retire-
ment.
Sevak (2002) compared the retirement rates of those with DC pension
plans with those with DB pension plans in 1992 and again in 1998.2 The
thinking is that those with DC plans had windfall gains from the stock
market run-up whereas those with DB plans did not have such gains, or at
least did not within the plans. Indeed, Sevak reports substantial increases
in the value of DC plans during the 1990s, as do Cheng and French. She
found that in 1998, DC plan holders had retirement rates about seven per-
centage points higher than DB plan holders compared with the diﬀerential
in 1992, and interpreted the diﬀerence to be due to the increase in value of
DC holdings. While the results have plausibility and are in accord with the
general aim of this chapter, we have some reservations based on the very
substantial increase in the fraction of the population with DC plans: in
1992 about 38 percent of men in the HRS population in the relevant age
range (ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty) had a DC plan, but in 1998 about 56 percent had
a DC plan. Similarly, the percentage of men with a DB plan only fell from
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2. The measure of retirement is a self-report about retirement, not actual labor force par-
ticipation.38 percent to 25 percent. Such a large compositional change means that
there could be other factors in the higher retirement rates: for example, if
those with a marginal attachment to the labor force were the same type of
people who acquired DC pensions between 1992 and 1998, the composi-
tional changes would be the correct explanation for the retirement diﬀer-
ence, not the run-up in the values of DC plans.
Hurd and Reti (2001) conducted an analysis based on four waves of the
HRS (1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998). Their measure of anticipated retire-
ment is the subjective probability of working full time past age sixty-two,
which we discuss at length later. They compared the change in anticipated
retirement of stockholders versus nonstockholders. They found no diﬀer-
ence in the change. Their study has a number of limitations, however. First,
there may be a time lag between stock price changes and changes in retire-
ment plans, because people often take time to adjust to new situations.3
Perhaps such changes in retirement plans had not taken place by 1998. Sec-
ond, the gains in the stock market accelerated after 1998, so possibly the
gains observed by Hurd and Reti were not yet large enough to induce sub-
stantial changes in behavior. Third, Hurd and Reti imposed no structure
on their estimation, yet theory suggests that people in diﬀering economic
circumstances or with diﬀering characteristics would have been aﬀected
diﬀerently. For example, if most of the wealth gain is concentrated among
the very well-to-do, there may be little change in average retirement be-
havior even though average wealth increased substantially. Fourth, Hurd
and Reti only studied wealth change in posttax accounts and had no con-
trol for pension wealth. But wealth in pretax accounts such as DC plans is
substantial, and for many may be a more important determinant of retire-
ment than wealth in posttax accounts. Furthermore, some who do not
have stocks in posttax accounts may have had gains in pretax accounts,
which would blur the diﬀerences between the two groups.
Coronado and Perozek (2003) found an eﬀect of stock market holdings,
but they used a diﬀerent measure of anticipated retirement than Hurd and
Reti—the expected retirement age. They compared the expected retire-
ment age as stated in 1992 with the actual retirement age as observed in
1998. This measure is more diﬃcult to use than the subjective probability
of working because of fairly high rates of nonresponse, because of right
censoring when comparing it with actual retirement, and because some
workers say they will never retire. Right censoring is particularly diﬃcult:
for example, by 1998 among those retired, 50 percent had retired earlier
than their expected retirement age as stated in 1992 but just 18 percent had
retired later. This diﬀerence indicates substantial censoring: many of them
who eventually will retire later than expected had not yet retired by 1998.
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3. For example, Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote report a lag of several years between win-
ning the lottery and changes in labor supply.A positive aspect of their paper is that Coronado and Perozek included
measures of pension wealth, which perhaps was responsible for their ﬁnd-
ing an eﬀect.
Khitatrakun (2004) based an analysis on the expected retirement age.
He made an advance over previous studies based on expected retirement
by controlling for right censoring and for stock market wealth and other
important determinants of retirement that could mitigate a wealth eﬀect.
He found a signiﬁcant reduction in expected retirement or actual retire-
ment among those who had substantial stock market wealth and who did
not have a deﬁned beneﬁts pension plan.4 For example, those with stock
holdings in the top 25 percent revised downward their expected retirement
age or actually retired about eleven months earlier than anticipated.5These
results are suggestive of a measurable eﬀect in the part of the population
that experienced an important gain in wealth.
Based on data from the HRS, the CPS, and the SCF, Coile and Levine
(2004) conclude that few households have enough stock wealth that the
variation in stock prices is likely to have a noticeable eﬀect on average la-
bor force participation rates. Indeed, they ﬁnd no evidence that changes in
the stock market had a measurable eﬀect on participation.
In summary, there were large changes in wealth for part of the prere-
tirement population, and at least some of the wealth change was likely
unanticipated. Their behavior in the waves of the HRS following the large
changes can be compared with the behavior of respondents who had no
such wealth changes. Whether there will be diﬀerences and whether they
can be attributed to a windfall wealth eﬀect will depend on whether the
wealth changes were anticipated. But there is a considerable literature that
takes the gains to be at least partially unexpected. For example, Poterba
(2000) states that “The evidence suggests that the rising stock market has
surely contributed to rising consumer spending in the 1990s.”6Were the in-
creases fully anticipated, economic theory would not call for any change in
consumption. If consumption responds to stock gains, the theory suggests
that retirement would also respond.
4.2 Wealth in the HRS population
Our study population will be the original HRS cohorts born in 1931
to 1941 and observed in 1992 and every two years until 2002, and the
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4. Restricting the sample to those lacking a DB plan for these estimations was done under
the argument that DB plans restrict freedom about when to retire, so that a stock gain would
have little eﬀect on expected or actual retirement.
5. However, the result is mainly due to the 1992 to 1994 and 1994 to 1996 waves. These were
not the waves of large stock market gains, which suggests that factors other than the stock
market may have been responsible.
6. See also Juster, Lupton, Smith, and Staﬀord (1999) and Parker (1999).War Baby cohorts born in 1942 to 1947 and observed in 1998, 2000, and
2002.
Table 4.1 shows cross-section income, wealth, and some components of
wealth, all measured at the household level. The unusual increase in in-
come at wave 4 is due to the induction of the War Baby cohort into the HRS
in 1998. They were ﬁfty-one to ﬁfty-six at the time and had higher average
income than the original HRS cohort. Income reached a maximum in wave
5, when the average age of the HRS cohort was about sixty-two, and then
began to decline as retirement accelerated. Wealth increased by 10 to 15
percent per wave until wave 5, when it increased by about 20 percent. There
was a large increase in ﬁnancial wealth and stock wealth between waves 4
and 5. The increase is partly the result of the boom in the stock market.
We deﬁne stock ownership either to be direct ownership outside the pen-
sion system or ownership in a deﬁned contribution (DC) pension. In the
HRS, respondents are asked whether they (or their spouse) own any stocks
or mutual funds. Respondents with DC pensions are asked whether any of
the DC balance is invested in stocks. Although there was an increase in the
percentage of the cohort holding stocks, from about 34 percent in wave 1
to 40 percent in wave 4, the primary cause of the increase in stock wealth
was gains in the value of stocks per household, not in the number of own-
ers. Housing wealth increased at a rate somewhat higher than the rate of
increase of consumer prices, which was about 2 percent per year over each
two-year period.
The change from wave to wave in cross-section income and wealth is not
necessarily the average change experienced by individuals in the cohort be-
cause of cohort eﬀects, diﬀerential mortality, and diﬀerential sample attri-
tion by socioeconomic stratum. Table 4.2 controls for cohort eﬀects and
changes in composition by following the same individuals over each two-
year panel comparison. For example, we observe data on 8,805 age-eligible
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Table 4.1 Average income and wealth (thousands) of age-eligible respondents, cross-section.
Total Number  Percent 
household Total  stock  stock 
Wave N income wealth Financial Housing Stock owners owners
1 9,769 46.1 206.6 47.3 60.6 18.7 3281 33.6
2 8,844 50.5 238.9 60.4 67.4 25.6 3181 36.0
3 8,467 53.9 264.7 70.4 72.5 36.0 3071 36.3
4 11,191 60.5 301.3 85.2 83.8 49.0 4332 38.7
5 10,584 63.1 361.8 103.5 97.0 62.2 4244 40.1
6 10,284 61.3 374.0 97.3 110.0 49.2 3868 37.6
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.
Note: Financial wealth, measured in nominal dollars, is the sum of the holdings of stocks, checking and
savings accounts, bonds, certiﬁcates of deposit, and other, minus debt. See table 4.3 for detailed listings.Table 4.2 Average income and wealth (thousands) of age-eligible respondents, panel.
Total Number  Percent 
household Total  stock  stock 
Wave N income wealth Financial Housing Stock owners owners
All
1 8,805 46.8 209.0 48.3 60.8 19.4 3061 34.8
2 8,805 50.5 238.9 60.6 67.5 25.7 3167 36.0
2 8,066 51.3 240.2 61.4 67.6 25.7 2986 37.0
3 8,066 54.1 266.0 70.9 72.2 36.1 2969 36.8
3 7,732 54.6 272.0 72.5 73.6 37.3 2874 37.2
4 7,732 54.9 314.3 90.8 87.1 51.1 2814 36.4
4 10,202 60.8 308.5 87.4 85.3 50.0 4044 39.6
5 10,202 63.2 365.5 104.5 97.5 62.9 4127 40.5
5 9,703 64.3 370.4 105.9 99.2 64.5 3985 41.1
6 9,703 61.6 373.2 98.4 111.1 49.8 3716 38.3
Stock owners in both waves
1 2,417 70.0 395.5 126.1 91.8 64.3 2417 100.0
2 2,417 81.0 473.9 156.0 111.7 81.7 2417 100.0
2 2,401 81.5 457.3 151.6 107.7 78.3 2401 100.0
3 2,401 85.6 520.0 185.4 111.7 112.2 2401 100.0
3 2,258 87.0 536.2 187.6 118.0 111.8 2258 100.0
4 2,258 89.6 651.4 242.4 149.0 156.7 2258 100.0
4 3,219 96.3 588.8 224.2 123.9 144.9 3219 100.0
5 3,219 103.4 704.1 260.0 148.6 178.7 3219 100.0
5 2,943 106.0 741.2 276.0 157.7 189.1 2943 100.0
6 2,943 101.3 734.9 246.4 177.5 148.6 2943 100.0
Stock owners in neither wave
1 4,994 32.2 106.3 11.8 42.1 0.0 0 0.0
2 4,994 32.7 110.5 14.9 45.5 0.0 0 0.0
2 4,512 33.4 111.5 14.2 42.7 0.0 0 0.0
3 4,512 34.8 118.9 13.0 47.9 0.0 0 0.0
3 4,302 34.1 118.9 12.7 48.0 0.0 0 0.0
4 4,302 34.0 122.6 13.5 52.8 0.0 0 0.0
4 5,250 37.9 123.7 11.7 51.7 0.0 0 0.0
5 5,250 37.0 142.3 16.4 57.9 0.0 0 0.0
5 4,945 37.0 143.0 15.9 58.5 0.0 0 0.0
6 4,945 36.6 154.3 19.5 67.4 0.0 0 0.0
Entrants into stock owning
1 750 53.9 215.9 27.1 74.7 0.0 0 0.0
2 750 59.3 312.2 73.2 80.8 38.0 750 100.0
2 568 61.0 264.3 49.6 82.7 0.0 0 0.0
3 568 66.7 345.6 82.0 94.3 37.9 568 100.0
3 556 65.0 291.7 35.9 83.6 0.0 0 0.0
4 556 73.3 447.2 128.1 97.2 73.7 556 100.0
4 908 59.3 274.2 33.6 87.4 0.0 0 0.0
5 908 74.6 444.2 123.5 114.4 72.7 908 100.0
5 773 64.6 374.0 37.5 135.7 0.0 0 0.0
6 773 68.6 444.9 114.7 127.0 60.0 773 100.0persons over the two-year period between waves 1 and 2. The income of the
households of those respondents increased from about $46.8 thousand to
$50.5 thousand, an increase of about 8 percent. This compares with a
cross-section two-year change from $46.1 to $50.5 (table 4.1). Overall, the
change in the panel is about the same as the change in the cross-section,
which shows that diﬀerential mortality and diﬀerential sample attrition 
are not very important determinants of the characteristics of the HRS
sample.7As far as the wealth components are concerned, they also changed
in the panel in about the same way as in the cross-section.
The second panel of table 4.2 shows income and wealth of those who
were owners of stocks in both of two consecutive waves. A comparison of
income in wave 2 among the 2,417 who survived in the panel from wave 1
to wave 2 ($81.0) with the income in wave 2 of the 2,401 who survived from
wave 2 to wave 3 ($81.5) shows that the panel aspects of the income data
are not very important at the aggregate level. Similar comparisons across
the other waves lead to the same conclusion.
The levels of total wealth and ﬁnancial wealth of stockholders were
much greater than average wealth. For example, in wave 1 stock owners
had total wealth of about $395,500 whereas average wealth was just
$209,000. Furthermore, the growth of wealth between the waves was much
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Table 4.2 (continued)
Total Number  Percent 
household Total  stock  stock 
Wave N income wealth Financial Housing Stock owners owners
Exiters from stock owning
1 644 64.4 297.1 63.6 73.9 23.6 644 100.0
2 644 64.2 266.9 42.6 56.7 0.0 0 0.0
2 585 55.8 318.1 66.4 80.5 33.6 585 100.0
3 585 61.3 281.0 36.7 76.4 0.0 0 0.0
3 616 70.1 354.9 100.8 79.9 58.7 616 100.0
4 616 56.2 296.8 41.6 90.1 0.0 0 0.0
4 825 69.8 428.9 94.8 146.3 52.9 825 100.0
5 825 60.8 378.6 37.8 131.1 0.0 0 0.0
5 1,042 76.0 399.5 103.4 100.2 66.2 1042 100.0
6 1,042 62.2 336.8 43.2 118.6 0.0 0 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.
Note: Financial wealth, measured in nominal dollars, is the sum of the holdings of stocks, checking 
and savings accounts, bonds, certiﬁcates of deposit, and other, minus debt. See table 4.3 for detailed 
listings.
7. Although diﬀerential morality is rather strong, the total number of deaths is too small to
have much inﬂuence on the sample characteristics.greater, especially between waves 3 and 4 and 4 and 5. Possibly more rele-
vant than the rate is the absolute level of the wealth of stockholders: wealth
increased by about $115,000 between waves 3 and 4, and by $116,000 be-
tween waves 4 and 5. Only a relatively small fraction of the increase could
have come from saving out of income, because the two-year total income
was only about $175,000 between waves 3 and 4 and $200,000 between
waves 4 and 5. This relationship between wealth increase and income is in
sharp contrast to the wealth change of the entire sample: for everyone,
wealth increased by $42,000, yet total income was about $55,000 per year,
or $110,000 over the two years between waves. Thus, for stockholders, the
achieved saving rate out of pretax income between waves 3 and 4 including
capital gains was about 65 percent, whereas for the entire sample it was
about 39 percent.
Among stock owners, wealth in housing was considerably higher than
average, and the growth rate was somewhat higher over the six waves,
about 115 percent compared with 80 percent for everyone. Whether hous-
ing wealth increased by converting some of the stock gains to housing
would require study of the detailed transactions. In any event, the gains are
only modestly larger among stockholders: for example, between waves 3
and 4, the housing wealth of stockholders increased by 26 percent com-
pared with a gain of 18 percent among nonstockholders.
Among stockholders in both waves, stock wealth increased between
waves 3 and 4 by about $45,000, or 40 percent. Over this same approximate
period the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index increased by 57
percent.8We do not know whether to attribute the diﬀerence in the rates of
return to diﬀerence in portfolios or to a rebalancing of portfolios.
The third panel shows the ﬁnancial situation of those who did not own
stock in either of two successive waves. For example, 4,994 persons were in
households that did not own stock either in wave 1 or wave 2. It is appar-
ent that this group had much lower levels of income and of all types of as-
sets, including housing, and that the rates of growth of assets were approx-
imately zero. Furthermore, this is the largest group of those considered
here, about 60 percent of the sample.
The next panel shows income and wealth of those who did not own stock
in a baseline wave but did own stock in the succeeding wave. The average
income in this group was mostly higher than of the entire sample, and con-
siderably higher than the income of those who were not stock owners, but
it was lower than the income of stock owners in both waves. This group had
large wealth increases, especially between waves 3 and 4, and 4 and 5:
about $160,000, even more than among stock owners in both waves. Even
among this group, which had very large wealth gains, little if any was put
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8. June 1, 1996 to June 1, 1998.into housing. For example, even though total wealth increased by about 53
percent between waves 3 and 4, average housing wealth increased by about
16 percent. The gain is similar to those who do not hold stocks: their hous-
ing wealth gain was 10 percent.
The ﬁnal panel of table 4.2 shows the ﬁnancial information of those who
owned stock in a baseline wave but not in the succeeding wave. Thus, 664
persons were in households that exited from the stock market between
waves 1 and 2. The overall pattern is one of fairly high wealth levels at the
baseline wave but substantially lower wealth at the next wave. Thus, own-
ership of stock predicts high wealth in cross-section, but eliminating stock
from the portfolio predicts a fall in wealth. Furthermore, the decline in
wealth was greater than the decline in the value of stockholdings. For ex-
ample, between waves 1 and 2, stock wealth declined by about $24,000 but
total wealth declined by about $30,000. Housing wealth declined particu-
larly between waves 1 and 2. Overall, these ﬁgures suggest some ﬁnancial
distress, leading the households to sell oﬀ their stockholdings and even re-
duce their housing wealth.
In summary, table 4.2 shows very active wealth dynamics, with some
groups gaining considerable wealth and some groups losing considerable
wealth. From the point of view of wealth inequality, the groups with the
highest initial wealth had the greatest wealth gains, both in absolute terms
and relative terms. These results suggest increasing wealth inequality over
time in the HRS cohort.
Because of the very large wealth changes between waves 4 and 5, we
show in table 4.3the detailed components of wealth in the panel over those
waves. Among all households, the value of IRAs, housing, and stock
wealth increased notably. The large increase in IRAs was probably at least
partly due to the stock market boom, but the HRS does not have very good
information about the composition of IRAs.9 The other components of
wealth were little changed.
Among those who owned stocks in both waves, the value of IRAs, stock
wealth, and housing increased. Holdings of CDs, checking and saving and
bonds changed very little, suggesting little rebalancing of portfolios in re-
sponse to the stock market gains.
Among those who were not stock owners, average holdings of each type
of wealth was small, with the exception of housing. Furthermore, except
for a 37 percent increase in IRAs, none of the wealth components in-
creased substantially. While this group, which constitutes about 60 per-
cent of our sample, has rather low levels of ﬁnancial assets, it includes
many people who are still in their ﬁfties and still have time to save before
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9. From 1998 on HRS asks whether an IRA held stocks. If so, whether the IRA is held




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.retirement. Furthermore, they are likely to be qualiﬁed for Social Security
beneﬁts, and some may anticipate pension income. However, because of
the positive correlation between household wealth and pension eligibility,
it is likely that many of the households in this group do not have rights to
a pension.
Among new entrants to the stock market, there were very substantial
gains in wealth. Aside from the increase in stock wealth, there were large
increases in business wealth, IRAs, and housing.
Those who left the stock market between waves had large declines in
housing and real estate as well as in stocks. The notable exception to the
overall fall in wealth was an increase in IRAs. Apparently IRAs were
shielded from the economic distress that is evident from the large wealth
decline.
4.3 Labor Force Participation in the HRS
Work status is derived from a self-report: whether working for pay, hours
worked, and a self-classiﬁcation as to retired, partially retired, or not re-
tired. From this, people are coded as working full-time, part-time, unem-
ployed, partly retired, retired, or not in the labor force. A combination of
the ﬁrst four categories corresponds to the current population survey
(CPS) deﬁnition of labor force participation.
Across the six waves of the HRS, we observe a decline in the percentage
of people working full time and part time (table 4.4), with a small up-tick
between waves 3 and 4 because of the inclusion of the younger War Baby
cohort, which is reﬂected in the increase in sample size. The percentage of
the sample retired increased across waves for both full and partial retire-
ment. Labor force participation declined with age (ﬁg. 4.1). When com-
pared with the labor force participation rates from the CPS, the HRS indi-
cates slightly higher participation rates, although the trend line is mirrored
(not shown). Labor force participation at each age was relatively constant
for all interview years of the HRS (not shown). An exception is labor force
participation by those aged approximately sixty-two to sixty-seven, where
participation increased especially between waves 4 and 5. At the gross level
of population participation this increase is at odds with a substantial stock
market wealth eﬀect.
Table 4.5 shows transitions from full-time work. About 79 percent of
full-time workers in wave 1 were working full time in wave 2. With the ex-
ception of 1998, when the War Baby cohort was added, in each successive
wave the transition rate to full-time work decreased and the rates of retire-
ment increased. There was some part-time work, but the dominant route
to retirement among full-time workers was to complete withdrawal from
the labor force.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A major strength of the HRS is that it asks about anticipated retirement.
This is especially important for this research, as we can study the change in
anticipated retirement and compare actual retirement with anticipated.
We will base anticipated retirement on the subjective probability of work-
ing past age sixty-two. It was asked of all workers in the following way:
Thinking about work generally and not just your present job, what do
you think are the chances that you will be working full time after you
reach age sixty-two?
The respondents had already been told to evaluate their chances “On a
scale of 0 to 100 where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 100 equals ab-
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Fig. 4.1 Labor force participation rates, cross-section
Table 4.5 Transition rates from full-time work
Employment status in following wave
All
Full Part  Partly  Not  in
Baseline time time Unemployed retired labor force N Percent
1992 79.3 5.4 1.9 3.0 10.4 4,903 100
1994 76.0 4.6 1.2 4.9 13.3 3,992 100
1996 74.0 4.5 1.2 5.7 14.6 3,302 100
1998 75.4 5.0 1.1 4.7 13.9 4,462 100
2000 70.1 5.8 1.9 6.0 16.3 3,644 100
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.solutely certain . . .” If the chances of working after age sixty-two were pos-
itive, the worker was asked about the chances of working after age sixty-
ﬁve. Because of the high rates of retirement at or near sixty-two, we will
base our measure of anticipated retirement on the chances of working af-
ter age sixty-two, which we call P62.
In waves 2 to 6 the subjective probability question was asked on a 101-
point schedule. In wave 1 scaling was on an eleven-point scale, 0–10. We
have analyzed the change in P62 from waves 1 to 2 and found an unex-
plained decline in P62 among those who worked in both waves. We found
no declines in other waves and the decline is not according to the laws of
probability: among those who remain in the labor force, P62 should in-
crease in panel as it does in other waves. Because of this unexplained de-
cline we will not make comparisons between waves 1 and 2. For the pur-
poses of this chapter, dropping this comparison is not important, because
the stock market boom did not begin until approximately wave 3 in 1996.
As far as the validity of P62 is concerned, it has been shown to vary in
cross-section with variables that induce retirement or are related to retire-
ment. For example, eligibility for a DB beneﬁt before age sixty-two is as-
sociated with actual retirement prior to age sixty-two, and it reduces P62
(Hurd and McGarry 1993). The implication is that P62 will predict ac-
tual retirement, and, indeed, it has considerable predictive power for retire-
ment in the HRS panel (Hurd 1999). While these results indicate that P62
has validity in a qualitative sense, in this chapter we would like to estab-
lish the validity of P62 as a predictor of the quantity of full-time work at
age sixty-two. To do that, we would like to answer two main questions:
Does P62 predict continuation of workers in full-time work? Is it properly
scaled; that is, does it predict the level of full-time work at or shortly after age
sixty-two?
The ﬁrst question, whether it predicts continuation in full-time work,
can be addressed by ﬁnding whether those with lower subjective probabil-
ities tend to leave full-time work before age sixty-two at a higher rate than
those with higher subjective probabilities. Even if the subjective probabil-
ity of working past sixty-two is not properly scaled, it could still be an ad-
equate predictor of continuation in full-time work until age sixty-two.
Table 4.6 shows the average P62 as reported in earlier waves as a func-
tion of work status in later waves. For example, 193 respondents who were
age sixty-two in wave 6 (2002) and working full time reported an average
P62 of 58.2 percent in wave 2 when they were approximately age ﬁfty-four.
They can be compared with 291 respondents who were not working full
time in wave 6: they reported an average P62 of 37.3 percent in wave 2. This
and other similar comparisons show that P62 is a rather consistent predic-
tor of working full time after age sixty-two, even when assessed up to eight
years earlier.
The second question—whether P62 is properly scaled, could in principle
142 Michael D. Hurd, Monika Reti, and Susann Rohwedderbe answered by comparing the average of P62 in some population with the
average rate of full-time work when that population reaches sixty-two. This
would be a valid comparison, because the expected participation rate of
each individual at age sixty-two is just P62, so the average population par-
ticipation rate would be approximately the average P62.10 There are, how-
ever, several obstacles to carrying out this comparison. First, even if each
individual correctly states his or her probability of working past sixty-two,
intervening events, such as an unexpected change in health status, will
cause a revision in P62. By itself, such a revision will not cause a divergence
between the average of the subjective probabilities and the average popula-
tion rate of working full time after age 62. If a population were fully in-
formed of the probabilities of events that could inﬂuence retirement, these
contingencies would be included in the calculation of P62. Thus, under ra-
tional expectations in a stationary environment, the average P62 should ac-
curately predict the average rate of full-time work after age sixty-two. How-
ever, if there were unanticipated events that aﬀect the entire population, 
the average of the subjective probability of working past sixty-two would
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Table 4.6 P62 as a qualitative predictor of labor force participation: mean P62 by age and
work status in 2002. Panel data, age-eligible cohort
Not working 
full time in 2002 Full time in 2002
Baseline wave Age in 2002 Observations Mean P62 Observations Mean P62
Wave 2 61 252 55.8 239 36.0
62 193 58.2 291 37.3
63 140 61.9 294 37.7
64 143 61.1 262 33.9
Wave 3 61 267 58.5 209 34.4
62 187 57.1 257 36.3
63 147 62.2 285 34.0
64 147 63.7 245 40.6
Wave 4 61 263 57.1 191 35.4
62 194 65.8 241 31.7
63 140 67.4 250 38.1
64 149 70.1 221 41.1
Wave 5 61 260 63.8 152 36.7
62 191 74.7 188 40.2
63 135 82.1 203 40.2
64 34 75.6 29 47.9
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.
10. Actual participation at age sixty-two is a binomial random variable that takes the value
of 1 with probability P62 and the value of 0 with probability 1–P62. Then, the expected value
of the average of the random variables will be the average of the P62.no longer predict the average rate of working full time after sixty-two. Such
events might be an unanticipated improvement in health in the population
or an unanticipated increase or decrease in wealth, such as that which re-
sulted from the stock market gains during the 1990s and subsequent losses.
We can test for proper scaling in two ways. First, we observe part of the
population in, say, wave 2 that will reach age sixty-two in some future wave.
The average P62 among workers in wave 2 should approximate the fraction
of those same workers who are working full time at age sixty-two. Similar
calculations can be made for other waves. Unfortunately, the query about
P62 is somewhat ambiguous, and could be interpreted as working full time
shortly after the sixty-second birthday or by the end of the year in which
the person was sixty-two years old. Our response to the ambiguity will be
to ﬁnd the fraction of sixty-two-year-olds working full time and the frac-
tion of sixty-three-year-olds working full-time.
Table 4.7 shows averages of P62 and actual rates of working full-time at
ages sixty-two and sixty-three. The averages of P62 were calculated over
workers in waves 2, 3, 4, or 5 who at the time of interview were less than age
sixty-two; the actual rates of full-time work were calculated over data from
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Table 4.7 P62 as a quantitative predictor of labor force participation. Panel data, 
age-eligible cohort
Age in 1996 Age in 1998 Age in 2000 Age in 2002
Baseline wave 62 63 62 63 62 63 62 63
Wave 2
Observations 347 322 420 371 416 411 484 434
Mean P62 51.3 54.9 45.5 51.2 46.9 41.9 45.6 45.5
Percent working 
full time 45.8 42.2 41.7 38.8 43.3 37.7 39.9 32.3
Wave 3
Observations 391 274 392 394 444 432
Mean P62 49.9 60.7 50.1 45.9 45.0 43.6
Percent working 
full time 46.3 47.4 45.7 40.9 42.1 34.0
Wave 4
Observations 370 313 435 390
Mean P62 51.5 53.9 46.9 48.6
Percent working 
full time 48.4 46.0 44.6 35.9
Wave 5
Observations 379 338
Mean P62 57.6 57.0
Percent working 
full time 50.4 39.9
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.later waves of workers who had passed their sixty-second birthday. For
example, we identiﬁed 347 people who were age sixty-two in wave 3 and
who were working in wave 2 when they would have been approximately age
sixty. In wave 2, their average subjective probability of working past sixty-
two was 51.3 percent, yet just 45.8 percent were observed working full time
when they were age sixty-two in wave 3. Similarly, we identiﬁed 322 people
who were age sixty-three in wave 3 and were working in wave 2 when they
would have been approximately age sixty-one. Their average subjective
probability of working past sixty-two was 54.9 percent, but just 42.2 per-
cent were actually working full time in wave 3. The divergence between P62
and the percentage working full time is much greater in the second column
than in the ﬁrst column because some left full-time work while age sixty-
two. A comparison in the other waves between the average subjective prob-
ability of working past sixty-two and the actual rate of full-time work
shows similar discrepancies: the average of the subjective probability is
about 4.2 percentage points higher than the actual rate of full-time work at
age sixty-two and about 10.3 percentage points higher than the rate at age
sixty-three. We conclude that the most plausible target age is age sixty-
two,and that the main reason for the diﬀerence between P62and the rate of
full-time work among respondents who are sixty-two is due to retirement
shortly after reaching age sixty-two. Even so, the diﬀerences are small
enough that they do not raise serious questions about the validity of the
P62 measure. Of course, it is plausible that unanticipated macro-events
caused the entire population to leave the labor force earlier than antici-
pated.
A second method of studying P62 for proper scaling is based on the pop-
ulation properties of P62 and how they evolve in the panel. The population
properties of P62 are broadly of two types: successive cross-sections and
panel. To see how they evolve, consider two extreme situations: in the ﬁrst
retirement is a completely controlled process with no uncertainty. At wave
1 all workers know their retirement ages, and if it is less than sixty-two, P62
is zero; if it is greater than sixty-two, P62 is 1. Between waves 1 and 2 some
workers reach their retirement ages and retire. Under the assumption that
no one reenters the labor force, the probability that the leavers would work
past sixty-two is zero, but because they correctly knew they would be leav-
ing the labor force between waves 1 and 2, they would have reported P62 
to be zero in wave 1. Thus were we to assign P62 to be zero in wave 2, it
would be unchanging in the panel over this group.
Those who remained in the labor force from wave 1 to 2 continue to an-
ticipate retiring at the same age as in wave 1, so P62 is either zero or 1, as it
was in wave 1. In panel the average P62 would be constant over this group.
Therefore, the average P62 would be constant in panel when averaged over
the population of both workers and leavers and the cross-section average
would be the same in both waves. The cross-section average calculated only
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excludes the leavers and they all reported P62 to be zero in wave 1.
Now consider the other extreme, where retirement is completely stochas-
tic—caused by a random health event or a random layoﬀ. Under the as-
sumption of rationality (workers know the probabilities of all events), P62
at time t given that someone is in the labor force would be calculated as
(1) (P62t⎪LF t)   (P62t 1⎪not LF t 1)P(not LF t 1) 
  (P62t 1⎪LF t 1)P(LF t 1).
If
(P62t⎪LF t)   (P62t 1⎪LF t 1)
then
(P62t 1⎪not LF t 1)   (P62t 1⎪LF t 1).
This relationship holds at the individual level, so that when P62 is averaged
over those who are in the labor force both at tand at t 1, P62 will increase
in the panel.
The population average of P62 in wave t 1 regardless of labor force sta-
tus is
∑(P62t 1)   ∑[(P62t 1⎪not LF t 1)P(not LF t 1) 
  (P62t 1⎪LF t 1)P(LF t 1)]
But the terms on the right-hand side of this equation are the same as the
right-hand side of (1), so that the average P62 is constant in panel when cal-
culated over the population, regardless of labor force status in t   1. This
implies that the cross-section average over the whole population will be un-
changing.11
The average P62 over workers in cross-section will increase from wave to
wave provided the average P62 reported in wave 1 by the leavers is the same
or smaller than the average reported by stayers. This condition will hold
provided P62 has explanatory power for retirement.
We would expect the actual situation to lie somewhere between the two
extremes: some workers are quite sure of their retirement age because of
pension provisions or tastes. Others have only weakly deﬁned retirement
preferences and wait for random events to unfold. Nonetheless, the pre-
dictions are the same: in a stable environment, average P62 should remain
constant as a cohort ages. Even though new information may arrive at the
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11. Assuming no entry into or exit from the population.ability, the revisions should roughly sum to zero, because individuals will
have correctly forecast the average probabilities of the new information
and the resulting revisions.
Were the probability of reentry to the labor force zero, it would be rather
easy to test for panel consistency of average P62. We would ﬁrst ﬁnd the av-
erage over workers in wave t. Under stationarity
P  6  2  t    ∑ P62t   ∑ P62t 1,
where there are nt workers at t. Then
∑ P62t 1    ∑(P62t 1⎪LF t 1)  ∑(P62t 1⎪not LF t 1) .
Under the assumption that
∑(P62t 1⎪not LF t 1)   0
the observed average over the working population would be
(2) P  6  2  t    ∑(P62t 1⎪LF t 1)    P  6  2  t     1  .
If (nt 1)/(nt), which is the retention rate in the labor force, is less than 1, as
it would be among those in their ﬁfties, the average P62 will increase with
age. A test of stationarity (with rational expectations) is that the average of
P62 among those in the labor force evolves according to (2).
It is likely, however, that some who leave the labor force will return;
hence the probability of working past sixty-two among those who left the
labor force between a baseline wave and the succeeding wave is not zero.
Because P62 is only asked of those who are working, we have no respon-
dent reports by those who left the labor force on the probability of work-
ing past sixty-two. The HRS does, however, ask nonworkers about reentry
into the labor force (date not speciﬁed), which should be powerfully related
to their probability of working at age sixty-two. Therefore we estimate P62
among those who are working at wave t but have left the labor force by
wave t   1 as follows.
We want P62t for the population that was working at t (and reported
P62t) but was not working at t   1. Our method is to ﬁt a predictive model
of working at age sixty-two over the population that was working at age a
but not working at age a   1. The covariates in this model are age and the
response to the following question:
P016 (On this same 0 to 100 scale), what are the chances that you will be
working for pay at some time in the future?
The left-hand variable is an indicator variable for whether the person is
observed to be working at age sixty-two. For example, someone age ﬁfty-



















The Eﬀect of Large Capital Gains or Losses on Retirment 147ﬁve and working in 1994 reported P62, but was not working in 1996. In the
HRS such a person would be asked about the probability of working at
some time in the future. In HRS 2002, when he was sixty-three, we observe
whether this person was working in 2001 when he turned sixty-two. If so,
the left-hand variable takes the value of 1, otherwise 0. The probability for
working sometime in the future has high predictive power for working at
age sixty-two: the estimated coeﬃcient and standard error are 0.42 and
0.03, respectively. The interpretation is that a change in the subjective
probability of working for pay from 0 to 100 will change the predicted
probability of working full time after the age of sixty-two by 42 percentage
points. We use this ﬁtted equation to estimate P62t 1 for the population
that was working at t (and reported P62t) but was not working at t   1.
Figure 4.2 shows the ﬁtted and actual probabilities of working at age
sixty-two among those in the labor force at t but not in the labor force at 
t   1, and the average values of P016.
Having calculated P62 for those who leave the labor force between wave
t and t   1, we can ﬁnd the panel change in P62 for all who were in the la-
bor force at wave t whether or not they remained in the labor force to wave
t   1.
Table 4.8 shows the results of our calculations of P62 in the panel.
Among the 752 who were age ﬁfty-four to ﬁfty-ﬁve in wave 3, were work-
148 Michael D. Hurd, Monika Reti, and Susann Rohwedder












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ing in wave 2, and reported a value of P62 in that wave, the average value
of P62 was 45.7 percent. This average is composed of 81 reports by those
who left the labor force between wave 2 and 3 and of 671 by those who re-
mained in the labor force. The average P62 of those who left was just 31.3
percent in wave 2. This shows again that P62 has considerable predictive
power for labor force participation even at ages considerably less than
sixty-two. Taking possible reentry into account, for that group we calculate
P62 in wave 3 to be 31.4 percent. The average in wave 2 of those who re-
mained in the labor force was 47.4 percent and the average in wave 3 was
46.6 percent. The overall average was 45.0 percent; therefore, the average
probability of the cohort declined by 0.7 percentage points between the
waves.
Because for this age group the predicted P62 in wave 3 among the leavers
is about the same as their average in wave 2, stationarity in P62 requires
that the average P62 of those who remained in the labor force also remain
constant between the waves as it did.
Similar calculations for those who were ﬁfty-six to ﬁfty-seven in wave 3,
and so forth show a sharply declining P62 by age among those who leave
the labor force between the waves. This is mainly a consequence of the
sharp decline in the probability of reentry, as shown in ﬁg. 4.2. If workers
knew the exact age at which they would retire, their reports of P62 would
not change in the panel so that P62 would be constant among those who
remained in the work force. If there are stochastic events that have positive
probability of occurring and that can cause a worker to leave the labor
force, the fact that a worker remained in the labor force should cause an up-
ward revision in P62. Just as in a life table, survival for two years in the la-
bor force increases the probability of survival in the labor force to any ﬁxed
age, such as sixty-two. We see this pattern in the age bands of ﬁfty-eight to
ﬁfty-nine and sixty to sixty-one.
We cannot make similar calculations for those aged ﬁfty-four to ﬁfty-ﬁve
in wave 4 because almost all of the age-eligibles were past that age by wave
4. For the other age groups, the patterns are similar, and for all ages taken
together P62 was almost exactly constant across waves.
The War Babies were added to HRS in 1998 (wave 4). In most age bands
the average P62 increased between waves 4 and 5.
At a broad level, the changes in P62 do not show any support for the hy-
pothesis that the large capital gains, especially between waves 3 and 4, and
4 and 5 were used to ﬁnance early retirement or led to a reduction in P62.
As shown in the last line of the table, the average change from wave 2 to 3
was 0.5, from wave 3 to 4 was –0.3, from wave 4 to 5 was 2.0, and from wave
5 to 6 was 0.4. The only substantial change was from wave 4 to 5, when the
stock market increased sharply. A wealth eﬀect would cause a reduction in
P62 rather than an increase.
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We can, of course, perform a much sharper test of our hypothesis by
studying wealth change at a more disaggregated level. So, we divided the
sample according to whether a household held stocks either directly or
held them indirectly in DC pension plans.12 Table 4.9 has ﬁnancial infor-
mation about our analytical sample. The sample is composed of those who
were working and reported P62 in wave t, and either reported P62 in wave
t   1 or left the labor force, allowing us to calculate P62 as we described
earlier.13 The income levels of this group are considerably higher than for
the entire HRS population as reported in table 4.2, especially in the later
waves. For example, average incomes in table 4.9 in waves 3 and 4 were
about $69.7 thousand and $72.5 thousand, whereas for the entire popula-
tion they were $54.6 thousand and $54.9 thousand. The main reason for
the diﬀerence is that everyone in table 4.9 was working at baseline.
Wealth increased very substantially between waves 3 and 4, and 4 and 5.
As would be expected from the run-up in the stock market, wealth in stocks
increased, with a corresponding increase in ﬁnancial wealth. But the in-
crease in ﬁnancial wealth only accounted for about one-third to one-half
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12. The HRS did not record stock ownership in IRAs prior to 1998, so we have not included
such ownership.
13. The sample size varies across tables because of missing values and sample selection. For
example, table 4.9 includes all age-eligibles, but table 4.8 includes only those in the speciﬁed
age bands, which excludes some age-eligibles.
Table 4.9 Average wealth (thousands) of age-eligibles who are in the labor force at time t and
report P62; panel
Total Number Percent
household Total stock stock
N income wealth Financial Housing Stock owners owners
Wave
2 3,465 60.5 238.6 55.8 68.9 24.0 1,470 42.4
3 3,465 66.3 266.4 66.9 73.1 33.6 1,500 43.3
Wave
3 2,450 69.7 268.8 63.8 74.8 32.7 1,092 44.6
4 2,450 72.5 339.9 96.5 100.1 54.2 1,101 44.9
Wave
4 3,442 78.5 306.7 75.8 92.2 45.1 1,732 50.3
5 3,442 84.3 379.5 100.9 103.3 63.1 1,764 51.2
Wave
5 2,326 89.8 380.2 103.5 103.9 68.7 1,288 55.4
6 2,326 88.5 381.0 96.9 118.6 54.3 1,203 51.7
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.of the total increase; other important components were housing and busi-
ness wealth (not shown separately). Between wave 5 and 6, stock wealth de-
clined, and when contrasted with the growth in prior waves, the rate of de-
cline was substantial: taking the average growth rate in stock wealth
between waves 3 and 5 would predict wave 6 stock wealth of about
$105,000 rather than the actual $54,300.
The rate of stock ownership is much higher than in table 4.2, partly a re-
ﬂection of the higher wealth of workers and the strong positive correlation
between wealth and the propensity to hold stocks. Also, the table includes
stock ownership via DC plans.
In table 4.10 we show the changes in the probability of working past
sixty-two that are associated with the large wealth changes. As discussed
earlier, the relevant population in each baseline wave is the working popu-
lation, selected to include those who report P62 and also selected to include
those for whom we have a value (either reported by the respondent or cal-
culated) of P62 in the succeeding wave. We call the baseline wave t and the
succeeding wave t   1. In waves 2 and 3 we observed 3,465 workers who
satisﬁed these criteria (and for whom we had observations on household
wealth, including their stock ownership status in both waves). Their aver-
age household wealth in wave t, which is wave 2 in this case, was $238,600,
and their nominal wealth increased by 11.6% by wave t   1 (wave 3). On
average, P62 increased from 45.1 to 45.6. The average P62 in wave 3 is cal-
culated over actual reports by those who remained in the labor force, and
over our estimate of the probability of working past sixty-two among those
who left the labor force between waves.
There were 1,206 respondents who were in households that owned
stocks in both waves 2 and 3. These households had an average increase in
wealth of 14.5 percent. Among the 1,701 respondents who did not own
stocks in either wave, wealth increased by 5.2 percent. New entrants into
stockholding had large wealth gains, and exiters from stockholding had al-
most constant nominal wealth.
In cross-section high wealth is associated with earlier expected retire-
ment: those who owned stocks in both waves t and t   1 had the most
wealth in wave t, and also the lowest average P62; those who owned stock
in neither wave had both the lowest wealth and the highest P62. However,
in the panel there is no systematic relationship between wealth change and
the change in P62: stockowners in both waves and new entrants into stock-
holding both had large gains in wealth; yet in one case P62 was almost con-
stant and in the other case it increased. Those who did not own stocks or
those who left stockholding both had small or little wealth increases, yet
P62 increased in one case and declined in the other.
Averaged over all respondents, wealth increased by 26.5 percent be-
tween waves 3 and 4, and 23.7 percent between waves 4 and 5. Comparing
the overall change in wealth and P62 from waves 2 to 3 with the overall
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.change in wealth and P62 from waves 3 to 4 and 4 to 5 we ﬁnd little support
for the idea that large changes in wealth led to earlier retirement: in the nor-
mal period between waves 2 and 3 wealth increased by 12 percent and P62
increased slightly; in the two succeeding abnormal periods, when wealth
increased by 24 to 27 percent, P62 was approximately constant or in-
creased.
This conclusion is reinforced when we compare the wealth change of
stock owners with the wealth change of those who owned in neither wave.
Among those who owned in both waves 3 and 4, wealth increased by
$145,000, or 32.2 percent, yet P62 increased by 1.3 percentage points.
Among those who owned in neither wave, both wealth and P62 were ap-
proximately constant. If we consider those who owned stock in neither
wave to be a control group that on average had its expectations realized
with respect to health, earnings, and so forth, its lack of revision in P62
suggests stationarity. Under our hypothesis, stock owners should then
have revised downward the probabilities of working past 62: instead they
revised them upward. Similarly, between waves 4 and 5 those who did not
own stocks had an increase in wealth of $24,000 and an increase in P62 of
1.6 percentage points. Stock owners had a much larger increase in wealth
($126,000) yet a larger increase in P62 (2.6 percentage points).
Only in waves 5 to 6 do we see a suggestion of a wealth eﬀect: owners of
stock had no wealth change, which was likely much below expectations,
and an increase in P62 of 1.7 percentage points. Those who did not own
stocks had an increase in wealth of $13,000 and a decline of P62 of 1.5 per-
centage points. Taking non-stock owners as the control group, we would
calculate a stock market eﬀect on P62 of 3.2 percentage points.
A possible explanation for the lack of a wealth eﬀect on P62 is that we
have not controlled for age. To do that we limit the presentation to a com-
parison between those who owned stocks in both waves and those who
owned stock in neither wave. In that these two groups experienced the
greatest diﬀerence in wealth change, we expect that they will have the
greatest diﬀerence in the change in retirement expectations.
Table 4.11 shows these changes. As an example of the overall results,
consider those who were ﬁfty-eight to ﬁfty-nine in wave 4. Between waves
3 and 4,323 stock owners had a remarkable wealth increase of about $190
thousand, or 45.7 percent, while 418 non-stock owners had approximately
constant wealth. Stock owners increased P62 by 0.7 percentage points and
non-stock owners increased P62 by 0.6 percentage points. This compari-
son is not consistent with the hypothesis that some of the large wealth gains
will be used to ﬁnance earlier retirement. Similar comparisons in waves 4
to 5 show, if anything, greater increases in P62 among stock owners than
among non-stock owners.
However, between waves 5 and 6 in every age band P62 increased among
stock owners, but with one exception it decreased among nonowners. For
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.example, among sixty- to sixty-one-year-olds, P62 increased by 1.2 per-
centage points among owners but declined by 3.0 percentage points among
nonowners. Over all age groups the average increase among owners was 1.7
percentage points and the average decrease among nonowners was 1.5 per-
centage points. Thus our estimate of the stock market eﬀect between waves
5 and 6 would be 3.2 percentage points.
We will use a Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the eﬀect on
years of full-time work, which may be a more natural concept to quantify
than P62.
Let ft be the survival curve in full-time work, and let ht be the hazard out
of full-time work.
ht   
and
 ln ft    htdt   c.
At some beginning age (say, ﬁfty-one) ft   1 so that c   0.
Suppose that during a time of surprising stock market gains or losses
ht,s   hte ts
where s   1 if a stock owner and 0 otherwise. During an era when stock
market gains are normal,  t   0 and we can estimate ht directly from data.
The strategy will be to use panel data on the number working full time at
time t   2 and the number working full time at t. Because of reentry into
the labor force they need not be the same people. Thus the hazard will be
the net hazard. We would like one-year hazards ht from t to t   1, but the
data panel span two years. Thus a two-year empirical hazard that spans
ages t to t   2 will include ht and ht 1. Our solution will be to use an aver-
age of the hazards from t – 1 to t   1 and from t to t   2 normalized to an
annual hazard.
Let ntbe the number working full-time at age t. In panel we observe pairs
(nt, nt 2) in adjacent waves. The average one-year hazard is
   .
Estimate ht as
            ,
which is the average of the one-year hazards centered on t. Then
ft ≈ e ∑
t
t 0ht.
The area to the left of this curve is the expected years of full-time work:


















d ln ft  
dt
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In an era of unexpected losses in the stock market, we have estimated 
f62,s – f62   k where k ≈ –0.032.
According to the Cox proportional hazard model
ft,s   e e s∫htdt   ( ft)e s
then
ln(f62,s)   e s ln(f62)   ln(k   f62)
and
e s   .
For example, if k   0.032 and f62   0.45, then e s   0.913 and
ft,s   f t
0.913.
Figure 4.3 shows a curve for estimated survival in full-time work begin-
ning at age ﬁfty-one, and a survival curve for those with an increased P62
due to stock market loss (k 0.032). The vertical distance between the two
curves at age sixty-two is 0.032. The eﬀect of the stock market loss on ex-
pected full-time work is the area between the two curves. This area is ap-
proximately 0.38 year out of an estimated remaining life expectancy in full-
time work of 8.7 years.
Although the results in table 4.11 for the change between waves 5 and 6
ln(k   f62)
  
ln(f62)
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Fig. 4.3 Survival in full-time workare suggestive, we would like a more formal statistical analysis. Therefore,
we estimated the regression of the change in P62 at the individual level on
categorical age indicators and on stock ownership indicators interacted
with wave transition indicators. Table 4.12 shows the results from that re-
gression for four wave transitions. The results broadly mirror what is in
table 4.11. For example, between waves 5 and 6 the change in P62 among
stock owners was 3.4 percentage points greater than the change in P62
among nonowners. However, the estimated standard error of that diﬀer-
ence is 2.1, so the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore,
the diﬀerences in the waves 3 to 5 are positive, whereas the gain in the stock
market suggests a downward adjustment to P62, which would lead to neg-
ative diﬀerences.
Thinking that noise in P62 may increase the standard errors substan-
tially, we investigated the qualitative change in P62: whether the change in
P62 is positive. We estimated the regression of an indicator variable for a
positive change on age and ownership indicators, as in table 4.12. The re-
sults are in table 4.13. The pattern is identical to the pattern in table 4.12,
but the scaling is diﬀerent: table 4.12 refers to a change in P62 that is scaled
0 to 100, whereas table 4.13 refers to the probability of an increase in P62
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Table 4.12 Regression results: Change in P62 by wave. Stock owners and 
nonstock owners
Standard error 
Stock owners Nonowners Diﬀerence of diﬀerence
Wave 2 to 3 –0.22 0.00 –0.22 1.38
Wave 3 to 4 0.45 –0.86 1.31 2.08
Wave 4 to 5 2.77 1.48 1.29 1.92
Wave 5 to 6 1.18 –2.22 3.41 2.13
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.
Note: Pooled regression across four wave transitions.
Table 4.13 Regression results: Probability of an increase in P62. Stock owners and
nonstock owners
Standard error 
Stock owners Nonowners Diﬀerence of diﬀerence
Wave 2 to 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032
Wave 3 to 4 0.030 –0.004 0.034 0.048
Wave 4 to 5 0.082 0.042 0.039 0.044
Wave 5 to 6 0.051 –0.048 0.099 0.049
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.
Note: The left-hand variable equals 1 if P62 increased between waves and equals 0 other-
wise.that is scaled 0 to 1.0. Thus, between waves 3 and 4 the probability is 0.034
greater among stockholders that the revision in P62 will be positive than
among nonowners. The diﬀerence in the probability of a gain between
waves 5 and 6 is 0.099, which is statistically signiﬁcant; that is, stock own-
ers were almost ten percentage points more likely to report an increase in
P62 between waves 5 and 6 as nonowners. This diﬀerence is consistent with
stock market losses causing an increase in retirement age.
We have been treating all stock owners as if they were the same, even
though stock wealth is highly skewed. We imagine that the stock wealth in-
crease would have to be substantial relative to total wealth to induce a de-
tectable change in retirement behavior. Accordingly, we constructed indi-
cator variables for total wealth and stock wealth quartiles and repeated the
type of regression reported in table 4.12 but with interactions between to-
tal wealth and stock wealth quartiles all interacted with the wave transi-
tion. Table 4.14 shows the variation in the change in P62 as a function of
the quartiles relative to nonowners. For example, in the top wealth and top
stock wealth quartiles in wave 3, P62 increased by 4.6 percentage points
more among owners than among nonowners. The table shows some sug-
gestive patterns: during the boom times of waves 3 to 5, P62 declined
among those in the top stock wealth quartile and the third wealth quartile
relative to nonowners. During the bust times of waves 5 to 6, P62 increased
among those in the same quartiles. These patterns would be expected ac-
cording to a wealth change argument especially because the intersection of
those quartiles contains those respondents with relatively great stock mar-
ket exposure. However, other entries in the table do not follow any such
easily interpretable pattern; furthermore, none of the entries is statistically
signiﬁcant.
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Table 4.14 Regression results: Change in P62 among stock owners relative to
nonstock owners by stock wealth and total wealth quartiles
Wealth quartile
Wave and stock wealth quartile 3 4
Wave 3 to 4
3 4.46 2.99
4 –4.73 4.63
Wave 4 to 5
3 2.58 3.67
4 –2.79 –0.29
Wave 5 to 6
3 0.80 1.57
4 5.14 4.91
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.
Note: Pooled regression across four wave transitions.We have been using the interview wave to group observations because of
the strong relationship between wave and stock market change. But within
a wave the actual interview date varied by as much as a year, so that the
stock market level varied a great deal even within a wave. Accordingly, the
change in the stock index varied greatly from observation to observation,
depending on interview date in both waves.
We addressed this problem by ﬁnding the level of the stock index during
the month of interview so that we can construct the actual change in the
stock index between interviews for each respondent. This provides addi-
tional variation in the change in stock prices and allows us to combine ob-
servations from diﬀerent waves.
We imagine that the eﬀect of stock price change on P62 could be non-
linear: variation in change within a normal range would have little eﬀect;
only large deviations from historical change would be interpreted by re-
spondents as an unexpected wealth eﬀect. Based on stock price change
data over about thirty years, we calculated the two-year stock price change
distribution. From this we generated individual indicator variables to show
whether the interview-to-interview change in the stock price was in one of
the percentile intervals 0 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 50, 50 to 90, 90 to 95, 95 to 100.
For example, all the observations based on waves 5 to 6 fell in the ﬁrst two
intervals, which represent the bottom 10 percent of historical stock price
changes.
Table 4.15 shows the results of the regression of the change in P62 on
variables that indicate in which of the stock change bands the actual
change in the stock index belonged. The coeﬃcients for nonowners control
for macro events so the diﬀerence is what is relevant. Thus stock owners
who were interviewed when the change in the stock market was in the low-
est 5 percent of historical stock changes revised upward P62 by 2.34 per-
centage points relative to nonowners who were interviewed at similar
times. We see that, indeed, there is little diﬀerence between owners and
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Table 4.15 Regression results: change in P62 according to stock index change since
last interview: stock owners and nonstock owners
Percentile of  Not  Standard Error 
stock index change Owners owners Diﬀerence of diﬀerence
0–5 1.88 –0.46 2.34 3.02
5–10 –1.54 –2.14 0.60 3.05
10–50 1.26 1.84 –0.59 1.94
50–90
90–95 –0.15 1.42 –1.57 2.61
95–100 –1.44 0.01 –1.44 2.61
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on HRS.nonowners when stock change was in the middle of the distribution. At the
extremes, the diﬀerences are what would be expected from an unexpected
wealth gain. However, as the standard errors show, none of the diﬀerences
is statistically signiﬁcant.14
A more direct way to estimate a wealth eﬀect is from the regression of
the change in P62 on the change in wealth. As noted in the introduction,
however, changes in wealth that are induced by a shock to health and that
simultaneously cause a change in retirement will lead to biased ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates of a wealth eﬀect. In this example, we might
see in panel a decline in wealth and a reduction in retirement age. There-
fore, we use predicted change in stock market wealth since the last inter-
view as an instrumental variable. That is, we specify
 P62      wealth   u
and
 wealth      stockindex   stockwealth
We believe u and  wealth are likely to be correlated.
In actual estimation, our instrumental variable is highly predictive of the
change in wealth. However, our estimates of   are not of a consistent sign
and are not statistically signiﬁcant, so we do not report them.
4.6 Conclusions
Between waves 3 and 5 of the HRS the stock market increased in value
at substantially greater rates than in recent history, and, accordingly, we
observe a large increase in the asset holdings of HRS households. We as-
sumed that much of the increase in wealth was unanticipated, because of
the very much greater rates of return than had been experienced in prior
years. Our major question was to ﬁnd whether households used this wealth
gain to retire earlier than anticipated.
We found no evidence that workers in those households which had large
gains retired earlier than they had anticipated or that they revised their re-
tirement expectations compared with workers in households that had no
large gains. We can compare these results with those of Imbens, Rubin, and
Sacerdote (2001). They estimated the eﬀect of windfall gains in wealth
from the behavior of lottery winners. Their basic ﬁnding was that large
gains induced a reduction in labor force participation. Based on a com-
parison of the change in labor force participation of winners with the
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14. We repeated these regressions, but with linear splines with knots at the percentile
points, as shown in table 4.15. The results are approximately the same and also lack statisti-
cal signiﬁcance, so we do not show them.change in labor force participation of losers (Imbens, Rubin, and Sacer-
dote, 2001, table 2) we calculate that a windfall gain of about $300,000,
which is approximately the wealth gain between waves 3 and 4 of stock-
holders in both waves, would reduce labor force participation by about one
percentage point. We interpret this to be a rather small eﬀect, basically in-
distinguishable from our main ﬁnding.
Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) used IRS data on inheritances
to estimate the eﬀect of large wealth gains on labor force participation.
Based on their estimates we calculate that a wealth gain of about $300,000
would reduce participation by about seven percentage points. This is a sub-
stantially diﬀerent magnitude from what we actually found.
We realize that in making these comparisons we have assumed that the
entire gain in wealth by stockholders was unanticipated whereas in reality
at least some of the gains would have been anticipated. We have no method
of separating anticipated from unanticipated gains, but were we able to iso-
late unanticipated gains, the diﬀerence between our results and the results
from Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen would be reduced.
Guided by the life-cycle model, we began this research with the expecta-
tion that the large wealth gains would be at least partly spent on earlier re-
tirement and that the losses would delay retirement. Our thinking was that
the gains were analogous to the thought experiment of giving a relatively
large group of older workers a windfall wealth shock. What actually hap-
pened was probably more complicated. There was, indeed, a large wealth
gain that we believe was largely unanticipated. But most likely the gain was
accompanied by a change in the expectation of the normal rate of return
on the stock market. Evidence for this conjecture is partly anecdotal. In ad-
dition, however, without such a change in expectations it would be diﬃcult
to explain the increase in the rate of stockholding. For example, between
waves 1 and 4 the rate of stock ownership in the HRS increased by about
four percentage points, or about 15 percent. If indeed the anticipated rate
of return from holding stocks increased substantially, the life-cycle model
cannot make a prediction about a contemporaneous increase in consump-
tion: the substitution toward saving induced by the large increase in the re-
ward from saving could overcome the income eﬀect resulting from the large
gains to wealth.
We found some suggestion that the decline in the stock market led to an
increase in the expected retirement age. Supposing that is the case, we have
no good explanation about the asymmetry: why there should be no re-
sponse to a stock gain and a possible response to a stock loss. Part of the
answer undoubtedly lies in expectations about future rates of return. There
may be, however, psychological explanations that are outside of the life-
cycle model, such as an unwillingness to reduce spending or asymmetries
with respect to gains and losses.
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